군사대국의 미래

군사대국의 미래

미국의 역사학자 중에 책 한 권을 서서 일약 세계적으로 유명하여진 학자가 있다. Paul Kennedy 교수이다. 그의 책은 『Rise and Fall of the great power(강대국의 흥망)』이란 제목의 책이다. 이 책의 핵심 내용은 군사대국(軍事大國) 정책의 미래가 어떻게 될 것인지에 대하여 말해 준다. 길고 긴 인류 역사 속에는 숱한 민족과 국가들이 일어났다가 사라지기를 거듭하여 왔다. 그렇게 흥망을 거듭한 나라들 중에 한 가지 원리가 있다. 경제력과 국민들의 문화력 그리고 국민들의 삶의 질에 대한 향상이 없이 그냥 군사력만 증강시킨 나라들은 몰락의 길을 걷게 되었다는 것이다. 그 대표적인 경우가 카르타고와 히틀러 정권 그리고 공산주의 러시아라고 지적하여 주고 있다. 러시아의 경우 한 때는 미국과 맞겨누는 정도의 군사력을 증강 시켰다. 그러나 끝내는 어이없이 무너지고 말았다. 그러한 군사력을 뒷받침할 수 있는 국가적인 경제력과 국민들의 삶의 질이 뒷받침 되지를 못하였기 때문이다. 결국은 러시아는 미국에 완패 당하고 말았다. 국민 전체의 경제력과 문화력의 뒷받침이 없이 군사대국 만을 추구하다가는 어느 단계까지는 강력한 것 같지만 어느 단계에 들어서면 그 체제가 가지는 한계로 인하여 어느 날 어이없이 무너지게 되고 만다는 것을 케네디 교수는 여러 가지 역사적 사례를 들면서 설명하고 있다. (06-10-18 김진홍 목사의 아침묵상중에서)                            영문 참고 자료   Customer Reviews                            Amazon.co.uk   Remembering the past, seeing the future..., 28 Dec 2005 By  Kurt Messick  (London, SW1)     History is a wonderful study, a professor of mine once commented, of the interlocking circles of influence, whereby one can find often that an obscure arranged marriage in the Dark Ages could be responsible for a thermonuclear exchange or a hostile corporate takeover today.   Of course, he was exaggerating, but only by a matter of degrees. History is the study of the interconnexions of human beings in their actions over time, and to that end, the more we understand of the past, the better chance we have of surviving and flourishing into the future.   Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is an insightful, sweeping examination of the centuries of the growth and dominance and, lately, relative decline of the European powers over the rest of the globe. To a lesser extent (because they were lesser players) he draws in Asian, and finally, American players, although as will be seen, they began to play the game according to the European rules.   He pays particular attention to the economic and military aspects of the motivations of national and ethnic decision-making; so often history (or at least popular history) has portrayed such as purely political, religious (at least until the last few centuries), or royal-family intrigues. Kennedy explores the forgotten aspects in a popular format; hence the question (as the Gulf War is almost universally recognised as, in reality, a war of economic necessity rather than for political or moral purpose, which tended to be added later)--were the Hapsburgs responsible? Rather, that is a way of asking, are the same motivations that were at play with Great Power relationships in 1500 still at play today? Have we learned anything?   At the beginning of 1500, it was by no means certain that Europe would become the dominant region of powers in the world. China was in decline but still perhaps the greatest power. Empires in India, Japan, and around Muscovy were also contenders. To their detriment, however, each of these powers tended to be isolated and introspective, more concerned with internal consistency and preservation of 'a way of life', whereas the smaller European powers had to compete with each other, and adapt and improve to survive. 'This dynamic of technological change and military competitiveness drove Europe forward in its usual jostling, pluralistic way.'   Occasionally, Europe tended toward the Asian models, particularly with the dominance of the Hapsburgs who, at their height, controlled much of Europe and began to insist on the same kinds of religious, historical, mercantile and cultural conformity that cost the other empires their vitality.   Great power struggles that occurred between 1660 and 1815 are difficult to characterise briefly, but chiefly is marked by the emergence of a cluster of powerful states which came to dominate diplomacy and militarily. After the Napoleonic era, there was a lull in Great Power warfare, until this century, when even the flank powers of Britain and Russia were a bit too central to the conflicts to survive with both military and economic strength intact.   'Given this book's concern with the interaction between strategy and economics, it seemed appropriate to offer a final (if necessarily speculative) chapter to explore the present disjuncture between the military balances and the productive balances among the Great Powers; and to point to the problems and opportunities facing today's five large politico-economic power centres...as they grapple with the age-old task of relating national means to national ends. The history of the rise and fall of the Great Powers has in no way come to a full stop.'   These Kennedy identifies as The United States, Japan, the EEC, the Russian States, and China. Of course, this has the possibility of shifting, too, as countries such as India and Brazil acquire more military and economic strength; countries such as Indonesia that are resource- and population-rich could also achieve Great Power status before long (historically speaking). Kennedy pays homage to the Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke, who wrote about die grossen Mächte in 1833, following since the fall of Spain. von Ranke also produces speculative chapters; perhaps it is natural for historians to want to chart the course of the future as well as mapping out the past.   This book reads like an epic, but is generally accessible (though somewhat intricate) and gives interesting insights, and is significant for what is does not address (many political scientists and historians will find some major theories ignored) as well as for the fresh approaches it does employ. Best read with other history books.     You really should read this book, 5 Jan 2004 By  DAVID-LEONARD WILLIS (Thessaloniki Greece)   As the relative strengths of leading nations in world affairs never remains constant, there is an optimum balance between wealth creation and military strength over the long term. Time and again the leading power believed that it could neglect wealth production in favor of military adventures but others waiting in the wings closed the gap, the relative strength was eroded and a long, slow decline of the once-leading power followed.   The rise of Europe was not obvious in 1500 considering Ming China, the Ottoman Empire, the Mogul Empire, Muscovy and Tokugawa Japan which were well organized, had centralized authority and insisted on uniformity of practice and belief. European knowledge of the Orient was fragmentary and often erroneous, although the image of fabulous wealth, and vast armies was reasonably accurate.   Constantinople fell in 1453 and the Ottoman Turks were pressing towards Budapest and Vienna. Compared with the world of Islam, Europe was behind culturally, technologically and militarily. Few at that point would have predicted that Europe would soon be at the top of the pack.   Warlike rivalries between European states stimulated advances, economic growth and military effectiveness. The Habsburg bid for power was ultimately unsuccessful because other European states worked together, the Habsburgs overextended in repeated conflicts during which they became militarily top heavy upon a weakening economic base.   The other European states managed a better balance between wealth creation and military power. The power struggles between 1600 and 1815 were more complicated as Spain and the Netherlands declined while France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia rose to dominate diplomacy, and warfare.   Britain gained an advantage by creating an advanced banking and credit system and, together with Russia had the capacity to intervene while being geographically sheltered from the center of conflict. Britain also started the industrial revolution before the others, providing a great wealth creation advantage.   For a century after 1815 no single nation was able to make a bid for domination, allowing Britain to rise to its zenith in naval, colonial and commercial terms based on its virtual monopoly of steam-driven industrial production. Industrialization spread in the second half of the 19th century tilting the balance of power but also introduced more complicated and expensive weaponry that transformed the nature of war and made the world less stable and more complex.   The European Great Powers declined while the US and Russia moved to the forefront. Germany was the only European country to stay with the future world powers; Japan was intent only on domination in East Asia and Britain, with its declining relative position, found it more difficult to defend its global interests.   World War I was an exhausting struggle that left Europe and Russia weakened, Japan better off and the US indisputably the strongest power in the world. However, US and Russian isolationism allowed France and Britain to remain center-stage diplomatically - a position they did not justify in power terms - but by the 1930s Italy, Japan and Germany became challengers while Russia was becoming an industrial superpower.   World War II eclipsed France, irretrievably weakened Britain, brought defeat to the Axis nations and left a bipolar world with military and economic resources roughly in balance.   Most of the book is devoted to tracing these events but the really interesting part of the book lies in the last two chapters where nuclear weapons, long-distance delivery systems and the arms race between the US and Russia changed the strategic and diplomatic landscape.   But the global productive balances changed faster than ever before with the EU now the world's largest trading unit, China leaping forward, and Japan experiencing phenomenal economic growth.   The US and Russian growth rates have been sluggish and their share of global production and wealth have shrunk dramatically since 1960. In economic terms we are in a multipolar world once again with five large power centers - China, Japan, the EU, the Soviet Union and the US - grappling with the age-old task of relating national means to national ends.   Although the US appears to be supreme, the history of the rise and fall of great powers has in no way come to a full stop. Great powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on security and thereby divert potential investment resources, compounding their long-term dilemma. Human kind makes its own history but within certain natural laws which become clear as the reader travels through this absorbing narrative.   In Chapter 8 Kennedy says: "What follows is speculation rather than history, therefore it is based upon the plausible assumption that these broad trends of the past five centuries are likely to continue." But certain trends are firmly in place.   In 1951 Japan's GNP was 1/3 of Britain and 1/20 of the US; three decades later it was three times Britain and half the US. Japan has grown to be the world's biggest creditor nation while the US has changed from being the world's biggest creditor nation to the world's biggest debtor nation.   This book was written before the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism so the projection is outdated. Nevertheless the grand sweep of history presented lends support to Kupchan's argument in 'The End of the American Era' that the defining element of the global system is the distribution of power, not democracy, culture, globalization, or anything else.   Add to that more recent projects that by 2020 China will be the largest world economy and that seven of the ten biggest economies will lie in Asia and the picture of the future becomes clearer. If you have the gut feeling that the US has over extended itself militarily compared to its economic base and its position in relation to its competitors, this book will make clear your worst fears.   Kennedy is a spiritual son of Toynbee and Spengler, 4 Jul 2002   By  Thierry Le Cocq (Paris France)     This book is a brilliant example of economic history. Written in Paul Kennedy's usual crystal-clear and riveting style, the Rise & Fall provides a comprehensive view of how political and economic might are connected. The book is also an illustration of the process of challenge and response described by Toynbee in relation to the life and death of civilizations. It is definitely an absolute must to anyone who whishes to understand some of the great laws of human evolution, what Spengler called the morphology of history.     An important book for understanding great power politics., 11 Nov 2001   By  cath@bsmall.co.uk (London, UK) I read this book several years ago but I often think about it and try to remember Paul Kennedy's thesis when discussing contemporary issues. It seems to me to be particularly relevant post-September 11th and I would be fascinated to know Professor Kennedy's views on the impact of this event - is it significant in the fall of the USA as a Great Power? Although it's a big, thick academic book and I read it on holiday when I had plenty of time, I remember finding it extremely interesting and very accessible for a layperson. The author analyses the historical, economic and political, reasons for the rise of the European Great Powers - France, Spain, Great Britain and lastly the USA with a glimpse towards the future - China. If I remember correctly, Great Powers rise when they have very little military spending and can concentrate on wealth creation and fall when they have to spend a large part of their income defending their empires. I highly recommend it (and was browsing Amazon because I want to buy another copy and read it again!)     Terrific: Exciting, shocking - in the AJP Taylor League, 21 Oct 2001 By  J. C. Okonkwo "JennyO" (London, England)     This is a really terrific book. The ambition level in writing a book of truly global history covering five hundred years is of course towering - and the reader is not disappointed.   I would compare it to AJP Taylor's "Struggle for Mastery in Europe" in scope and quality of writing. What makes this book special - and play in the AJP Taylor Zone - is the ability to overlay facts with historical perspective, resulting in a number of really interesting facts.   For example, why Europe's belligerance was both its rise and also, its downfall - how the great wars of european combinations were a theme from 1500 all the way through to 1939, and not just a late nineteen/twentieth century phenomena, and consequently, why Europe was doomed: almost like war kept catching fire, and then exhausting itself, like a bomb is used to extinguish oil rig fires.   Similiarly, how Islam arrived in the Northern Indian Subcontinent, and the Balkans. Why the Spanish nation declined. The impact of the industrial revolution. Many of these topics are areas we were taught at school, but sometimes have not necessarily taken with the appropriate judgement - for example, when AJP Taylor says Britain and France's imperialism were a sign of its weakness, not its strength - by preying on non-european states.   Read it, you will find it of huge educational value, and it fills in a lot of gaps in understanding. My only caution is that whilst its perspective is global, ultimately, it is the story of the great powers and therefore, is focussed largely on the first and second worlds.